United Nations S/2015/839

Security Council

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Identical letters dated 4 November 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Since the last time that I wrote to you, the wave of terror targeting Israelis has continued to spread throughout the nation. October was a bloody month for Israel, with 58 stabbings, 5 shootings and 6 vehicular attacks, which left 11 Israelis dead and 145 injured, 18 of them seriously. A complete list of the attacks is annexed to the present letter.

Sadly, it seems that November does not bring happier tidings. Only two days ago, a Palestinian terrorist went on a stabbing spree in Rishon Lezion, seriously injuring two Israelis, including an 80-year-old woman. At the same time, a 70-year-old man was stabbed by a Palestinian youth in the city of Netanya and was critically wounded.

I said it before and I will say it again — the root cause of these attacks is incitement. These stabbing sprees are a direct result of the inflammatory rhetoric used by Palestinian Authority officials.

The most recent example of Palestinian incitement against Israel was the letter sent by the Palestinian representative to the United Nations, dated 3 November 2015, in which he accused Israel of harvesting the organs of deceased Palestinians. This is a despicable accusation that draws on vicious anti-Semitic blood libels from the past.

It is outrageous that the Palestinians abuse the United Nations to demonize and delegitimize Israel.

Anti-Semitism has no place in the halls of the United Nations and must be denounced. I call upon you to repudiate this sinister accusation and to condemn the ongoing incitement by Palestinian leaders.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-19281 (E) 061115

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Annex to the identical letters dated 4 November 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Terror attacks in Israel from 1 October to 2 November 2015

The following is a review of major terror attacks against Israeli civilians that have occurred since 1 October 2015. This is a partial list, which does not include attacks thwarted by the security forces or the many instances of rock throwing and Molotov cocktail attacks that did not result in severe injuries.

1 October

- On a road leading to **Elon Moreh**: Rabbi Eitam Henkin (31 years of age) and his wife Naama (30 years of age) were murdered in a drive-by shooting while travelling with their four young children (4 months and 4, 7 and 9 years of age)

3 October

- **Jerusalem**: Two individuals were killed in a stabbing attack near the Lion's Gate. Aharon Banita-Bennet (22 years of age) was stabbed to death on the way to the Western Wall in the Old City on Saturday evening with his wife and two young children. His wife and 2-year-old son were wounded. Rabbi Nehemia Lavi, a father of seven, who came to the aid of the Banita-Bennett family, was attacked and stabbed to death

4 October

- **Jerusalem**: Moshe Malka (15 years of age) was stabbed and wounded near a light rail stop on his way to prayers at the Western Wall

7 October

- **Petach Tikva**: A knife-wielding attacker at a shopping mall wounded one individual. The knife broke, preventing further victims
- **Gush Etzion** (Judea, south of Jerusalem): A woman (38 years of age) was attacked while driving from her home in Tekoa. The attackers threw rocks at her and tried to drag her from her car. Lightly wounded, she succeeded in closing the car door and escaped
- **Jerusalem**: A Palestinian woman (18 years of age) stabbed a 36-year-old man at the Lion's Gate in the Old City
- **Kiryat Gat**: A terrorist stabbed an Israeli Defense Forces soldier and snatched his gun, then ran into a nearby apartment, where a woman was just returning home. She fought with him and managed to flee. The terrorist was killed by the police

8 October

- **Tel Aviv**: A female soldier and three other individuals were stabbed. The terrorist was shot and killed

- **Jerusalem**: A yeshiva student (25 years of age) was seriously injured and another man was lightly injured in a stabbing attack near the light rail. The terrorist (19 years of age) was arrested
- **Kiryat Arba**: A man (31 years of age) was seriously wounded in a stabbing attack
- **Afula**: A soldier was stabbed by a resident of Jenin (20 years of age), who was apprehended by bystanders and held until the police arrived

9 October

- **Jerusalem**: A boy (16 years of age) was beaten and stabbed and lightly injured. The attacker (18 years of age, from Hebron in the West Bank) was later apprehended by police
- **Kiryat Arba**: A terrorist stabbed a police officer (47 years of age) and tried to grab the officer's gun. Other officers shot the terrorist
- **Afula**: A female terrorist tried to stab a security guard at the central bus station. She was shot and wounded

10 October

- **Jerusalem**: A terrorist (16 years of age) stabbed two men in their 60s near the Damascus Gate, leaving one moderately wounded and the other lightly wounded. The terrorist then attacked border police officers, who shot and killed him
- **Jerusalem** (near the Damascus Gate): A Palestinian (19 years of age, from Shuafat) stabbed two police officers

11 October

- **Maaleh Adumim-Jerusalem highway**: A police officer was lightly injured when he pulled over a driver who was acting suspiciously, and the driver set off an explosive device. Gas canisters were found in the car
- **Northern Israel** (between Hadera and Afula): Four people were injured at a bus station in a combined ramming/stabbing attack. A female soldier (19 years of age) is in serious condition (as at 13 October, her situation remained critical); a girl (who turned 15 years of age on that day) is in moderate condition; two men (20 and 45 years of age) are in light condition. The terrorist first rammed his car into two of the victims, then got out of the car and started stabbing the victims. The terrorist (20 years of age, from Umm el Fahm in northern Israel) was apprehended with the help of bystanders

12 October

- **Jerusalem**: A stabbing attack was foiled at the Lion's Gate in Jerusalem's Old City. The terrorist (18 years of age, from eastern Jerusalem) was shot and killed
- **Jerusalem** (Ammunition Hill, in northern Jerusalem): A border policeman was stabbed and lightly injured by a female terrorist (16 years of age)
- **Jerusalem** (Pisgat Zeev, in northern Jerusalem): Two terrorists (13 and 17 years of age) stabbed and seriously wounded a man (25 years of age) and a

boy (13 years of age) who was riding his bicycle. Police shot and killed one of the terrorists and apprehended the other. The boy is in critical condition

- **Jerusalem**: A terrorist (22 years of age) on a bus stabbed a soldier (19 years of age) and tried to grab the soldier's gun. After a struggle, the terrorist was shot and killed by a police officer

13 October

- **Ra'anana** (in the centre of the country, north-east of Tel Aviv): Two stabbing attacks occurred in the morning, one hour apart. The first attack occurred at a bus stop on a main street, during which a man (32 years of age) suffered light wounds; the attacker (from eastern Jerusalem) was subdued by passers-by and held until the police arrived. The second attack resulted in one person being seriously wounded and three others being lightly wounded; the terrorist was arrested
- **Jerusalem**: A shooting and stabbing attack occurred on a bus in a southern Jerusalem neighbourhood. One individual (60 years of age) was killed and 15 others were wounded, several of them seriously. Police shot and subdued the two terrorist perpetrators
- **Jerusalem**: A ramming/stabbing attack occurred at a bus stop not far from the central bus station. One individual was killed, several others were injured

14 October

- **Jerusalem**: A woman (72 years of age) was stabbed and injured while waiting for a bus at the central bus station
- **Jerusalem**: Two civilians were injured at the Damascus Gate in the Old City

16 October

- **Hebron**: An Israeli Defense Forces soldier was stabbed and moderately wounded by a terrorist disguised as a photojournalist
- **Nablus**: Joseph's Tomb was set ablaze by hundreds of Palestinian rioters and suffered severe damage

17 October

- **Hebron**: Civilians were attacked on the way to morning prayers
- **Hebron**: A border patrol officer was stabbed and lightly wounded. The female terrorist (16 years of age) was shot and killed
- **Hebron**: An Israeli Defense Forces soldier was stabbed and moderately wounded at a police checkpoint. The terrorist (18 years of age) was shot and critically wounded
- **Jerusalem**: A terrorist attempted to stab one police officer and a bomb squad officer at the Kalandiya checkpoint

18 October

- **Beer Sheva**: Two individuals were killed and eleven were injured. A terrorist armed with a knife and a pistol entered the central bus station, shot the soldier,

grabbed the soldier's gun and started shooting. The terrorist (21 years of age, a Bedouin from the town of Hura) was shot and killed by police officers

20 October

- **Hebron**: During a riot, a soldier was lightly wounded by a Palestinian armed with a knife
- **Fawwar** (south-west of Hebron): An Israeli man (54 years of age) was run over and killed by a truck after his vehicle had been stoned
- **Gush Etzion**: A soldier (20 years of age) and a civilian (21 years of age) were lightly injured during an attempted ramming/stabbing attack
- **Hebron**: An Israeli Defense Forces soldier was lightly wounded by two Palestinian terrorists (16 and 17 years of age)
- **Jerusalem**: A female soldier (19 years of age) was seriously wounded during a stabbing attack by two terrorists
- **Gush Etzion**: Five soldiers were injured after their vehicle had been stoned

22 October

- **Beit Shemesh**: A yeshiva student (18 years of age) was lightly injured during a stabbing attack carried out by two Palestinians

23 October

- **Route 60** (north of Jerusalem): Five members of a family, two parents and three children, were lightly to moderately injured when Palestinian terrorists threw a firebomb at their vehicle

24 October

- **Jalameh (Gilboa) crossing** (north of Jenin in the West Bank): A Palestinian (16 years of age), posing as a sweets vendor, tried to stab a security guard

25 October

- **Metzad** (Gush Etzion bloc): An Israeli driver (58 years of age) was forced to stop on a road, which was blocked. A terrorist smashed his windshield and stabbed him repeatedly
- **Hebron**: A female Arab terrorist (17 years of age) from Hebron attempted to stab border police officers with a knife
- **Ariel Junction**: An Israeli (25 years of age) waiting for a ride was stabbed by a Palestinian (26 years of age, from a village near Nablus), who subsequently fled

26 October

- **Kiryat Arbah**: An Israeli soldier was seriously injured in a stabbing attack

27 October

- **Jerusalem**: A terror attack was foiled — two Arabs (16 and 17 years of age, from eastern Jerusalem), armed with an axe and a knife, were arrested in the centre of town (Kikar Tzahal)

28 October

- **Gush Etzion**: A woman, a mother of eight children, was stabbed in the back and moderately wounded. The attack occurred next to a supermarket where she had just gone shopping. The attacker was apprehended
- **Hebron**: A Palestinian who had attempted to stab a soldier was shot and killed

29 October

- **Near the Tomb of the Patriarchs**: An Israeli Defense Forces soldier was stabbed in the head and lightly wounded
- **Hebron**: A terrorist who had attempted to stab an Israeli Defense Forces soldier was shot
- **Jerusalem**: Shots were fired from a passing vehicle towards a bus stop near Jerusalem

30 October

- **Jerusalem**: Two Israeli civilians were injured in a stabbing attack. The assailant was shot at the scene
- **Tapuah Junction**: There was an attempted stabbing of border police officers

31 October

- **Jalameh (Gilboa) crossing** (north of Jenin in the West Bank): A knifing attack was foiled by security forces

1 November

- **Kiryat Arba/Hebron**: During a violent riot, an assailant attempted to stab an Israeli Defense Forces soldier. The assailant was shot and killed
- **Beit Anun checkpoint** (north of Hebron): Three border police officers were injured (one moderately and the other two lightly) in a vehicle ramming attack

2 November

- **Jalameh (Gilboa) crossing** (near Afula): Assailants attempted to stab Israeli Defense Forces soldiers
- **Rishon Lezion**: Three Israelis were injured, two seriously (including an 80-year-old woman) and one lightly, in a stabbing attack near the central bus station. The attacker (19 years of age, from the Hebron area) was apprehended
- **Netanya**: A 70-year-old man was stabbed and is in serious condition. The attacker (22 years old, from the Tulkarem area) was wounded and apprehended by security forces

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Angola, Chad, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Taking note of the Secretary-General's letter of 7 October 2015 covering United Nations support activities in Somalia ("the Secretary-General's letter" S/2015/762),

Taking note of the African Union Peace and Security Council's 18 September 2015 communiqué on UNSOA,

Noting with appreciation the positive contributions that the UN Support Office to AMISOM (UNSOA) has made to supporting the gains made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and *underscoring* that such contributions are evidence of a successful partnership between the United Nations, the African Union and Member States in Somalia,

Expressing further its gratitude to AMISOM and Somali National Army (SNA) personnel for the sacrifices which they have made in the fight against Al Shabaab,

Expressing concern at the Secretary-General's finding that despite the innovation and best efforts of UNSOA, its resources and resultant capacities have not been able to keep pace with the dramatic expansion of the requested logistical support and that there is a progressively widening gap between the logistical support UNSOA is requested to deliver and its capacity to deliver,

Welcoming the observations and recommendations of the Secretary-General to address gaps in UNSOA's ability to deliver, and *further welcoming* the steps already being taken and *urging* their full implementation as a matter of urgency,

1. *Emphasizes* the role and impact of a responsive, effective, efficient and responsible field support platform as a strategic enabler in Somalia, and in view of the expansion of UNSOA's mission since its establishment in 2009, *decides* that UNSOA shall bear the name of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) (and which will be responsible for support to AMISOM, UNSOM and the Somali National Army on joint operations with AMISOM);

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2. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's assessment that UNSOS should consolidate and prioritise its efforts in line with the Security Council's strategic objectives in Somalia, and in that context and on an exceptional basis and owing to the unique character of AMISOM, *requests* that the Secretary-General continue to provide, under the Department of Field Support, logistical support primarily to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel in AMISOM and 70 AMISOM civilians, the SNA on joint operations with AMISOM, and UNSOM as follows:

AMISOM

(a) The provision of rations, fuel, water, accommodation and infrastructure, maintenance services including all partner donated and partner owned equipment jointly recognised as being required by the African Union, the United Nations and the TCC, all key equipment such as armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and engineering equipment to be maintained at an operational ready rate of 75% or above, medical support, aviation, strategic communications, explosive hazard management capacities (including mitigation strategies) and strategic personnel and equipment movements;

(b) The reimbursement of contingent owned equipment, considered owned by the Troop Contributing Country, in line with United Nations rates and practices including through Letters of Assist, with the understanding that eligible equipment shall be limited to equipment jointly recognized as required by the African Union, the United Nations and the TCC and be subject to periodic reviews by UNSOS to ensure full operational capability and that the equipment is fit for purpose;

(c) The reimbursement of basic and essential supplies and services required to allow AMISOM contingents to sustain themselves, taking into account the operational tempo of AMISOM's operations and other relevant factors, and including catering equipment and training to ensure safe preparation of rations, VHF/UHF, HF, telephone and TETRA communications; sanitary and cleaning materials; furniture and stationery; and tactical tentage, *decides* that reimbursements will be limited to these categories, be in line with United Nations standards, rates and practices and subject to periodic reviews by UNSOS to ensure full provision, and *further decides* that where a TCC is unable to provide the necessary sustainment required by the United Nations and the African Union in the categories above, limited support in lieu of reimbursement will be provided to ensure basic and minimum standards;

(d) Support the efforts of the African Union and AMISOM in the coordination of support to AMISOM among bilateral partners and the United Nations and maintenance of, and quarterly reporting to the Council as well as donors on, a United Nations Trust Fund to provide financial support to AMISOM;

UNSOM

(e) The provision of the standard range of mission support services to UNSOM in support of the delivery of its mandate, including support to strengthen its presence in all capitals of Interim Regional Administrations in accordance with paragraph 24 of resolution 2232 (2015);

Somali Federal Security Institutions

(f) The provision, on an exceptional basis, of a targeted support package for 10,900 troops in the Somali National Army (SNA) on joint operations with AMISOM and where they are a part of AMISOM's overall strategic concept, which will consist of the provision of food and water, fuel, transport, tents, defence stores and appropriate VHF/UHF, HF communication equipment to enable interoperability with AMISOM, and in-theatre medical evacuation, *reaffirms* that direct support for this assistance will be funded from an appropriate United Nations Trust Fund with UNSOS personnel responsible for ensuring the delivery of this support package and its compliance with the Secretary-General's Human Rights Due Diligence Policy and in accordance with paragraph 14 and 15 of resolution 2124;

(g) The provision on an exceptional and cost recovery basis of in-theatre medical evacuation for the Somali National Police Force on joint operations with AMISOM and where they are a part of AMISOM's overall strategic concept, for casualties sustained in the line of duty and in areas of operation where similar support is provided to AMISOM and the Somali National Army;

3. *Emphasizes* that any support provided by UNSOS to AMISOM, the Somali National Army and, in the context of paragraph 2g above, the Somali National Police Force shall be in full compliance with the Secretary-General's Human Rights Due Diligence Policy under the overall responsibility of the SRSG, who shall work in close coordination with the Special Representative of the of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia ("the AMISOM SRCC");

4. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's intention to address and streamline administrative and procurement processes, including recruitment, in UNSOS, *underlines* the importance of UNSOS being able to respond swiftly to the operational demands in Somalia, *agrees* with the Secretary-General on the need to strengthen the leadership functions within UNSOS, *agrees* that UNSOS leadership should be Mogadishu-based, and in this context *decides* that the Head of UNSOS shall report to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the delivery of UNSOS' mandate set out above, and through the SRSG to the Security Council, and *stresses* that the Head of UNSOS should have separate quantifiable compacts with both the Head of UNSOM for the delivery of support to UNSOM and the AMISOM SRCC for the delivery of support to AMISOM;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue efforts to support the African Union through advice and guidance on the implementation of a system to address allegations of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse;

6. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to consider the environmental impact of the UN fulfilling its mandated tasks, including carrying out an environmental baseline study and regular environmental impact assessments of the operations of UNSOM and UNSOS;

7. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to support the African Union in the development of its environmental policies in Somalia and their implementation in AMISOM through the provision of mentoring and guidance;

8. *Underlines* the need to ensure full transparency and proper accountability for resources provided, including those made available through the SNA trust fund,

and in this context, requests the Secretary-General to ensure a robust internal control framework is in place and regular financial and substantive reporting on the SNA trust fund through the SRSG is provided to the Council as well as to donors;

9. *Recognizes* the unique nature of UNSOS' mission, *welcomes* the Secretary-General's intention to strengthen the joint senior leadership decision-making framework between UNSOM and AMISOM and ensure operational efforts are aligned with a common set of strategic priorities, and *requests* the Secretary-General to include progress made in establishing this framework in his reports on Somalia to the Security Council;

10. *Reiterates* that the sustainable delivery of logistical support remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and the African Union, *recognizes* that the current logistical arrangements as noted in paragraphs 41 and 42 the Secretary-General's letter are unsustainable, and *requests* AMISOM and the SNA to ensure that they give the utmost priority to securing key supply routes essential to improve the humanitarian situation in the most affected areas, and as a critical condition for logistical support to AMISOM;

11. *Renews* its call to the AU to expedite the deployment of AMISOM force enablers and multipliers as provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 2036 (2012), and as called for in resolution 2124 (2013), as well as addressing critical logistical gaps within AMISOM TCCs, and *calls on* Member States to support the efforts of the AU in mobilising such equipment urgently;

12. *Encourages* Member States to support AMISOM through the provision of assistance to the AU and AMISOM TCCs of financial support for the payment of troop stipends, training, technical assistance and the provision of ammunition (in accordance with the relevant exemption from the arms embargo in Somalia), as well as through uncaveated financial contributions to the AMISOM Trust Fund;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to work closely with the AU in improving the performance of AMISOM through the delivery of the AMISOM support package as well as support the African Union in the form of technical and expert advice in its coordination efforts and within the areas of UNSOS mandate;

14. *Welcomes* the intention of Member States to provide uniformed personnel as well as government provided personnel to UNSOS in support of the delivery of its mandated tasks, and *looks forward* to further details on their deployment;

15. *Recalls* the recommendations of the Secretary General in relation to the provision of a non-lethal support package to the Somali National Police Force and extension of the non-lethal support package for the Somali National Army to Puntland security forces, *notes* the Secretary-General's assessment that this support should be provided by entities other than UNSOS, and *requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed of progress to identify a suitable entity to provide this support;

16. *Decides* to keep UNSOS' mandate under review in line with that of AMISOM, and in that context, *decides* to review and take any action to renew or revise the provisions set out in paragraph 2 above before 30 May 2016;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council in detail on the implementation of this resolution, and specifically on any challenges faced

by UNSOS in carrying out its mandate as part of Secretary-General's regular reports on Somalia;

18. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 5 November 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1031 (1995), I have the honour to transmit the forty-eighth report on the implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, covering the period from 21 April to 21 October 2015, which I received from the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

15-18751 (E) 061115

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Annex

Letter dated 26 October 2015 from the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary-General

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1031 (1995), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to it reports from the High Representative in accordance with annex 10 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Conclusions of the London Peace Implementation Conference of 8 and 9 December 1995, I herewith present to you the forty-eighth report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. I would ask that the report be distributed to the Security Council members for their consideration.

This is my fourteenth regular report to the Secretary-General since assuming the post of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and European Union Special Representative on 26 March 2009. The present report covers the period from 21 April 2015 to 21 October 2015.

Should you or any Council member require any information beyond what is provided in the attached report or have any questions regarding its contents, I should be pleased to provide you with it.

(*Signed*) Valentin **Inzko**

Forty-eighth report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina

Summary

The present report covers the period from 21 April 2015 to 21 October 2015. The reporting period has been dominated by several notable developments: the decision of the Republika Srpska authorities to hold a referendum that directly challenges the General Framework Agreement for Peace and the threat of the Republika Srpska-based Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) to hold an independence referendum in 2018; the entry into force of the Stabilization and Association Agreement; other steps to advance the European Union reform agenda, such as the adoption of the new Federation Labour Law; and a number of notable security incidents.

The decision of the Republika Srpska authorities to hold a referendum that directly challenges the General Framework Agreement for Peace and the threat of SNSD to hold an independence referendum in 2018 represent an escalation of the SNSD policy to challenge the fundamentals of the Agreement and the steps taken to implement it. I refer you to my special report of 4 September for details on what is one of the most serious challenges to the Agreement since its signing in 1995. In addition, the reporting period was marked by a number of fresh statements by officials from the Republika Srpska calling for that entity's secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the authority vested in me, I use this report to once again make clear that the entities have no right to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina under the General Framework Agreement for Peace and that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina are guaranteed by the Agreement, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution and international law.

The signing and adoption of Bosnia and Herzegovina's written commitment to the European Union integration process opened the way for the European Union to take a decision for the Stabilization and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina to enter into force on 1 June. The subsequent adoption of the reform agenda by State and entity authorities and the delivery of concrete steps, such as the Federation's adoption of the new Labour Law, offer hope that the authorities may finally start to focus on delivering the reforms that would enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to apply for European Union candidate country status and to unlock the activation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Membership Action Plan. As noted in previous reports, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to make a decisive break with the past by doing politics in a new way, one that puts the interests of citizens and the country as a whole first.

Regarding the NATO Membership Action Plan, I warmly welcome the registration of defence property in the name of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina that has taken place in the Federation, and now look for similar progress to be made in the Republika Srpska. It should be noted that the decision to send Bosnia and Herzegovina's formal application for the NATO Membership Action Plan was taken unanimously by the Serb, Bosniak and Croat Members of the Presidency in 2010 and transmitted with the signature of the Presiding Serb Member of the Presidency coming from the SNSD party.

The reporting period also saw several security incidents that run the risk of having a wider impact on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The shooting at a police station in Zvornik on 27 April, several attacks on returnees which appear to have been ethnically motivated, and the attack on the Prime Minister of Serbia at the twentieth anniversary commemoration for the genocide committed in Srebrenica, confirmed the potential for security incidents to occur at any time. The rise in such security incidents is something that the international community should be concerned about.

Given the complex environment that continues to prevail in the country, the presence of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) with an executive mandate remains of vital importance, enabling my Office and others in the international community to fulfil our respective mandates as well as reassure citizens from all ethnic groups throughout the country of a safe and secure environment.

I. Introduction

1. This is my fourteenth report to the Secretary-General since assuming the post of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It provides a narrative description of progress made towards attaining the goals outlined in previous reports, registers factual developments, logs relevant citations relating to the reporting period and provides my assessment of the implementation of key areas falling under my mandate. I have focused my efforts on addressing these areas, in line with my primary responsibility to uphold the civilian aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, while also encouraging progress on the five objectives and two conditions necessary for the closure of the Office of the High Representative and working to preserve steps that have been undertaken previously to implement the Agreement.

2. My energies continue to be directed towards meeting my mandate, as defined under annex 10 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace and relevant resolutions of the Security Council. My Office fully supports the efforts of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to help Bosnia and Herzegovina move along the path towards closer integration with those organizations.

II. Political update

A. General political environment

3. I regret that challenges to the General Framework Agreement for Peace have increased during the reporting period. Most seriously, on 15 July 2015, the Republika Srpska National Assembly adopted a decision to hold a referendum in the Republika Srpska on the validity of the legislation on the Court and Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the applicability of these institutions' decisions on the territory of that entity, as well as on the authorities and decisions of the High Representative. In other words, the referendum question proposes that the Republika Srpska leave the common judicial space of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republika Srpska National Assembly took this step despite a clear prior warning on 14 July from the Steering Board Ambassadors of the Peace Implementation Council, minus the Russian Federation, which did not join the statement of the Peace Implementation Council.

4. These actions have cast a shadow over positive efforts by political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina to advance economic and social reforms that would address the problems facing the country and potentially unlock further progress towards the European Union, following the entry into force of the Stabilization and Association Agreement on 1 June. The readiness of the authorities to advance the reform agenda has been the bright spot of the reporting period and it is now imperative that these efforts are accelerated, while the Republika Srpska referendum is put aside and future actions remain in full compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace.

5. The reporting period has also been marked by several security incidents that raise concern about the overall atmosphere in the country and the ongoing need for reconciliation to be advanced in local communities, and in the country as a whole.

6. Following the withdrawal of the Democratic Front (DF) party from the ruling coalition in the Federation, the Federation Parliament has been without a stable majority. On a more positive note, the government formation process following the October 2014 general elections was completed during the reporting period, with new cantonal governments finally elected in Canton 10 on 5 May, Central Bosnia Canton on 9 June and Herzegovina-Neretva Canton on 23 September.

B. Decisions of the High Representative during the reporting period

7. During the reporting period, I refrained from using my executive powers in line with the policy of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council of emphasizing "local ownership" over international decision-making.

C. Five objectives and two conditions for closure of the Office of the High Representative

Progress on objectives

8. During the reporting period, the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina made limited progress towards meeting the outstanding objectives (5+2 agenda) set by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council as necessary for the closure of the Office of the High Representative.

State and defence property

9. The process of registering so-called prospective defence property under the ownership of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defence initiated in December 2014, is progressing well, albeit only in the Federation. Owing to the efforts of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defence and the Public Attorney's Office, 18 prospective defence locations have been successfully registered under the ownership of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina so far, while several others are in various phases of the registration process.

10. In the Republika Srpska, obstacles to the registration of prospective defence properties have been encountered. On 19 August 2015, the Bijeljina Field Office of the Republika Srpska Administration for Geodetic and Property-Related Affairs issued a first-instance decision rejecting the request for the registration of a defence location, owing to what the Field Office claimed to be the "non-existence of a valid legal basis", despite there being a clear basis provided by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Law on Defence and relevant decisions of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency. This first-instance decision is currently under review in an appeals procedure before the Republika Srpska Geodetic Administration in Banja Luka.

11. In addition to this rejection of a registration request in the Republika Srpska, there is also an ongoing property dispute before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the "Veliki Žep" defence location in the Han Pijesak municipality in the Republika Srpska. On 3 July, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina rendered a first-instance judgement in the property dispute, in which it accepted the litigation claim of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and explicitly determined that the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina has ownership rights over this

particular defence location. I welcome this court ruling. In the explanation of the judgement, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina established that the State property of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia located on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (including defence property) had been transferred into the ownership of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 1 March 1992, on the basis of and pursuant to the Agreement on Succession Issues of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Additionally, the Court acknowledged other legal arguments put forward by the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the relevant decision of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitutional Court of July 2012, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Law on Defence, the relevant decisions of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency and the High Representative's Law on the Temporary Prohibition of Disposal of State Property of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Appellate Division of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently processing the appeal of the Republika Srpska against this first-instance judgement. The second-instance judgement is expected in the next several weeks.

Fiscal sustainability

12. The Office of the High Representative continued to follow, analyse and inform its international partners on developments related to fiscal sustainability, including developments in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Fiscal Council and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Indirect Taxation Authority Governing Board. During the reporting period, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Fiscal Council met twice, adopting the Global Framework of Fiscal Balance and Policies for 2016-2018, which will provide a basis for the preparation of the budgets for 2016.

13. The Indirect Taxation Authority Governing Board met four times in the reporting period, and among other acts, approved the decision on criteria for determining large tax payers as proposed by the Authority, designed to improve tax oversight. A session held on 29 July was significant, as the Board agreed on the allocation of accumulated road toll revenues as well as on the indirect tax revenue allocation coefficients for the third quarter of the year. Owing to past opposition of the Republika Srpska, this was the first time in over a year that the Governing Board adjusted entity coefficients. Delaying these adjustments calls into question compliance with the Governing Board regulations and results in unsettled debts between the entities. This practice has been misused to challenge the indirect tax system, which provides most of budget revenue at all levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14. An illustration of this was the recent lawsuit by the Republika Srpska against the Indirect Taxation Authority, which may have serious implications on the future functioning of the indirect tax system. On 7 May, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued a final ruling in the civil case *Republika Srpska vs. the Bosnia and Herzegovina Indirect Taxation Authority*, in which the Republika Srpska sued the Authority for compensation in relation to indirect tax revenue incorrectly allocated to the Federation in 2009 and 2010. As mentioned above, regular delays by the Governing Board of the Authority in adjusting coefficients and rebalancing revenues within the legal deadlines owing primarily to challenges from the Republika Srpska are the source of regular debts between the entities. In this particular case, the capital debt of BAM 52 million (approximately €26 million) was already settled by the Federation in 2011, but the Republika Srpska sued the Authority for interest on this debt. The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ruled in

favour of the Republika Srpska, obliging the Indirect Taxation Authority to pay to the Republika Srpska over BAM 15 million within 30 days. The Authority has appealed the case to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Brcko District

15. In May, a dispute in the Brcko District Assembly over a proposed resolution on the Srebrenica genocide precipitated a falling-out within the ruling coalition, a three-month break in assembly sessions and a month-and-a-half break in government sessions. Several citizens associations, including unemployed youth, health-care workers and farmers, participated in strikes against the authorities' inaction during this period. The crisis was defused and assembly sessions resumed in September. Both the executive and the assembly are now meeting regularly.

16. During the reporting period, my Office continued to work with the Brcko District institutions in preparing laws related to financial matters, relevant for the implementation of the memorandum on institutional cooperation and exchange of data among the four tax administrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The laws also aim to support the District in improving transparency in the business environment, fighting the grey economy and harmonizing the District's legal system with the rest of the country.

17. My Office also continued to work with the District institutions to amend the Brcko District Assembly decision of 2012 on the protection of the civilian victims of war, according to which civilian victims of sexual violence were required to produce evidence of a judicial conviction against perpetrators in order to obtain the status of a civilian victim and receive compensation and other benefits. As a consequence of the application of this decision, many civilian victims who live in the Brcko District have moved to the Federation or registered their place of residence there in order to be recognized as victims of war and to be entitled to benefits. In a welcome move, the Brcko District Assembly adopted the amended decision on 10 June 2015 and I now look forward to the new system being implemented in a manner that ensures the rights of these civilian victims to assistance.

18. On 6 October, the Brcko District Appellate Court ruled that the Brcko District budget for 2015 was not adopted in line with requirements on ethnic quorums during voting, and therefore the previously adopted budget was no longer in force. The Brcko District Assembly scrambled to ensure continued financing in the wake of the Court's decision, amending the Brcko District Law on Budget to allow temporary financing beyond the first quarter, which the Assembly subsequently approved until the end of 2015. Considering the limited scope of budget payments allowed under temporary financing, the readoption of a budget for 2015 would be the best way to address the financing gap, in line with the Appellate Court's decision.

D. Challenges to the General Framework Agreement for Peace

Challenges to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina

19. During the reporting period, officials from SNSD, the ruling party in the Republika Srpska, continued their practice of directly challenging the General Framework Agreement for Peace and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republika Srpska President, who is also the President

of SNSD, continued to be the most frequent and vocal exponent of state dissolution. These statements alternated between arguing that the dissolution of the country is inevitable,[1] threatening a Republika Srpska secession referendum if certain demands were not met,[2] and announcing that a referendum on independence would occur.[3] He also continued to claim, incorrectly, that the Republika Srpska was already a state and that the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not enjoy competencies or sovereignty except as they derived from the entities.[4] In addition, under his initiative, the Republika Srpska National Assembly and his party, SNSD, took concrete steps that threaten to violate the General Framework Agreement for Peace.

Decision of the Republika Srpska National Assembly *on holding a referendum*

20. On 15 July, the Republika Srpska National Assembly adopted a decision to hold a referendum in the Republika Srpska on the validity of the legislation of the Court and Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the applicability of these institutions' decisions on the territory on that entity, as well as on the authorities and decisions of the High Representative. The referendum question provided in the Republika Srpska National Assembly decision on calling the Republika Srpska entity-wide referendum is as follows:

> Do you support the unconstitutional and unauthorized imposition of laws by the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the imposed laws on the Court and Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the implementation of their decisions on the territory of Republika Srpska. [sic]

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[1] "You won't find anyone in the RS who does not agree with the thesis that it is inevitable that one day the RS and Serbia will in some way be the same in the legal state and political sense." Milorad Dodik, *Vijesti.ba*, 18 October 2015; "Bosnia and Herzegovina will collapse; it will collapse with them and without me. I believe that I have even contributed to its sustainability. But it will fall apart." Milorad Dodik, *Newsweek Srbija*, 21 September 2015.

[2] "We have told everybody that we want a dialogue. If you do not want to have a dialogue with us, if you do not want to harmonize Bosnia and Herzegovina with Dayton, in 2017 our proposal will be a referendum on the status of the RS. And that status implies a free and independent Republika Srpska." Milorad Dodik, *NIN magazine*, 28 May 2015; "In that regard we said clearly that, unless there are visible and tangible elements of stabilization of the RS in accordance with the Constitution until 2017, meaning that many competencies that were stolen must be returned, in 2018 the RS will carry out a referendum on its status, to determine its status. The proposal will be an independent state." Milorad Dodik, *Blic online/FENA, Istocno Sarajevo SNSD Congress*, 25 April 2015.

[3] "I am ready to be sacrificed so that we could exercise our right to a referendum because Srpska is the meaning of the historical struggle of these people. We are free in Srpska today. We must never stop fighting for independence." Milorad Dodik, *Večernje novosti*, 27 July 2015; "Now I am glad that the SNSD adopted the Declaration with which we do not call for a war but for the UN Charter, which defines that peoples have the right to self-determination until secession ... in the referendum we will ask the citizens whether they want to live in an independent RS, and if they say 'yes', we will make that decision. If NATO wants to arrest us all because of that, let them do it." Milorad Dodik, *Blic online/SRNA*, 13 May 2015.

[4] "We Serbs have the right to regulate our two states — Serbia and the RS, and we will do it; our message is that there is room for everyone who wants peace, cooperation, good and comfortable life." Milorad Dodik, *RTRS*, 4 August 2015; "We are fighting for a state ... It's about a state here which is called Republika Srpska. It brought its territory and sovereignty, its capacity into the Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a state only in the international legal sense, while it has no competences internally." Milorad Dodik, *N1*, 28 July 2015.

21. With the referendum at hand, the Republika Srpska authorities are acting unilaterally in an area where the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not the entity, has constitutional authority. They would effectively ask citizens of the Republika Srpska whether the entity should "opt out" of its requirement to comply with the laws establishing the State judicial authorities as well as the decisions taken by these authorities. As such, the referendum constitutes an open challenge to the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a violation of the Republika Srpska's commitments and obligations arising under the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution, as set forth in annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace.

22. The referendum also seeks to determine whether the authorities of the High Representative, in particular legislation enacted by the High Representative, should be recognized by the entity. As with the State judiciary, the entity does not have the authority to make this determination, since the authorities of the High Representative arise under international law.

23. This act by the Republika Srpska National Assembly should also be seen in the context of the long-standing policy of officials from SNSD to challenge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including through open advocacy for the secession of the Republika Srpska and the dissolution of the country. In this regard, it is worth highlighting that, in April 2015, the leading party in the Republika Srpska, SNSD, adopted as part of its official party platform the goal of pursuing the Republika Srpska as an "independent state within its current borders" and called for a referendum on secession in 2018 if the party's demands with regard to redistributing competencies between levels of government are not met.

24. Having these considerations in mind, I consider that the adoption of this decision by the Republika Srpska National Assembly, together with the official positions expressed by the Republika Srpska President before and after its adoption, represents one of the most serious violations of the General Framework Agreement for Peace since its signing in 1995 and puts under serious threat peace implementation since then.

25. Given that this constitutes a clear breach of the Agreement, on 4 September I sent the Security Council a detailed special report on this matter.

26. Since I submitted my report of 4 September, there have been no major developments on this issue, as at the time of writing, the decision of the Republika Srpska National Assembly on the referendum has yet to be published in the *Official Gazette* and is therefore not yet in force.

SNSD party adopts declaration on the holding of a Republika Srpska independence referendum in 2018

27. As referenced above, the SNSD party adopted a declaration on 25 April, entitled "Republika Srpska — free and independent — future and responsibility". In this document, the ruling party in the Republika Srpska stated its intention to organize a referendum on the independence of the Republika Srpska in 2018 if demands related to the distribution of competences between the entities and the State are not met by 2017. Furthermore, the declaration suggests that the Republika Srpska authorities might decide at a future point to regulate "by law which decisions made by the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities shall be applicable on the territory

of the Republika Srpska". SNSD President Dodik reiterated publicly that if competencies which SNSD alleges were usurped from the entity are not "returned" by 2017, then there would be an independence referendum in 2018.

Republika Srpska National Assembly conclusions seek to bind State-level decision makers

28. On 20 October the Republika Srpska National Assembly adopted a set of conclusions which, among other provisions, seek to oblige elected and appointed State-level officials from the territory of the Republika Srpska in the Bosnia and Herzegovina State institutions to request opinions from relevant committees of the Republika Srpska National Assembly prior to adopting decisions and legal acts at the State level. The conclusions also call on the government to propose amendments criminalizing participation in the "unauthorized transfer of competencies from the Republika Srpska to the Bosnia and Herzegovina level". These conclusions represent a direct attempt to exert extreme pressure on State-level representatives from the Republika Srpska to follow instructions from the Republika Srpska and the current SNSD-led authorities, and more importantly, to subjugate the State-level institutions in violation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution. Although not yet in force and subject to subsequent consideration by the Republika Srpska Council of Peoples, these conclusions constitute a direct attack on the autonomy and independence of State-level officials and institutions.

29. Over the past six years there has been a consistent effort by the authorities of the Republika Srpska to negate the very agreement that recognized it as an entity. The Republika Srpska National Assembly Conclusions of 20 October 2015 are only the latest in a series of challenges to Dayton. These conclusions are in line with other conclusions recently adopted, by which the Republika Srpska National Assembly claims the right to accept or not accept constitutional court decisions. They rely on the false assumption that Bosnia and Herzegovina was established as a confederation in 1995 by two pre-existing "states" (the Republika Srpska and the Federation), and that consequently the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina can only exercise those powers that have been explicitly delegated by them, and only for as long as these two "states" agree. The conclusions formally disregard and/or reject the fundamentals of the Dayton Peace Agreement, in particular the principles established under annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace.

Challenges to peace and security

30. During the reporting period, several security incidents impacted the overall political situation in the country, demonstrating the need for greater effort to be made to advance reconciliation.

Gunman kills police officer in Zvornik

31. On 27 April, a Bosniak returnee from a village in the Zvornik municipality (Republika Srpska) opened fire on police officers outside the Zvornik police station with a long-barrelled weapon. He killed one police officer and wounded two others before police returned fire, killing him. All three police officers were Serbs.

32. In response, the Republika Srpska police conducted an operation throughout the Republika Srpska reportedly aimed at individuals suspected of links to terrorism, detaining several individuals, of which, after initial questioning, two

remained in custody. The Mayor of Zvornik, Zoran Stevanović, played an important role in calming the situation in Zvornik after the attack, and I wish to praise his leadership in particular for preventing any further deterioration of the security situation in that municipality.

33. While political actors throughout the country were quick to condemn the attack, some politicians from the Federation argued publicly over whether it should be qualified as terrorism and whether the response by the Republika Srpska police had unfairly targeted returnee communities. All relevant State institutions eventually condemned the attack, and the State-level Ministry of Security was tasked to prepare measures aimed at better coordination of police in preventing and responding to similar incidents in the future. On 30 July, the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the conclusions of the Joint Defence and Security Committee, which described the attack on the police station in Zvornik. During the parliamentary debate, several delegates pointed to poor coordination between police bodies and unprofessional reporting, and to a lack of true capacity in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fight terrorism.

Attack on the Prime Minister of Serbia

34. During the twentieth anniversary commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide, a number of persons attacked the Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, with rocks and water bottles, causing minor injuries. The Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency condemned the attack and demanded a thorough investigation. Both houses of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina also condemned the attack and offered an apology to the Prime Minister of Serbia. Prime Minister Vučić eased tensions with his statements that despite the incident, he would continue to work on reconciliation between Serbs and Bosniaks. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency subsequently accepted Prime Minister Vučić's invitation and visited Belgrade on 22 July, which was held in a positive atmosphere, with calls for further cooperation between the two countries. I wish to praise Prime Minister Vučić for his courageous efforts before, during and after the commemoration to advance reconciliation efforts in the region.

Violent inter-ethnic incidents

35. On 14 July, three masked persons reportedly attacked a Bosniak returnee to the Republika Srpska in Vrbanjci, near Kotor Varos, beating him and carving the Cyrillic letter "S" four times into his stomach with a knife (representing a popular Serb national motto: Only Unity Saves the Serbs). The investigation is ongoing with the case still pending before the Banja Luka County Prosecutor's Office. No indictment has been issued.

36. On 12 August, a group of Serbs physically attacked a group of Bosniaks in Prijedor, sending one person to the hospital. The Republika Srpska police quickly identified and arrested the attackers.

37. On 15 August, a group of Croat youths left an open gas canister at the entrance to the mosque in the Bosniak village of Omerovici, in the Croat majority municipality of Tomislavgrad in the Federation. Local police reported that they detained six people connected to the incident, and sought an additional two suspects.

III. State-level institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina

A. Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency

38. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency met regularly during the reporting period (eight regular and three urgent sessions) as it played a prominent role in seeking to advance Bosnia and Herzegovina along the European integration path. Soon after the Stabilization and Association Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union entered into force on 1 June, the Presidency adopted the Master Plan for Integration into the European Union, which is a breakdown of activities and timelines for Bosnia and Herzegovina to acquire European Union candidate status by the end of 2017.

39. Upholding their agreement to work in a constructive atmosphere and avoid public disagreements, the three Presidency members agreed on a joint platform for presentations of the Bosnia and Herzegovina delegation at the United Nations General Assembly held in September.

40. On 4 May, the Presidency agreed on the proposed Bosnia and Herzegovina budget for 2015, which the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina subsequently adopted. On 6 June in Sarajevo, the Presidency successfully hosted His Holiness Pope Francis, whose message of peace and reconciliation was warmly received throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 8 October, the Presidency adopted reports on the participation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina armed forces in international peace operations, and proposed that the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament approve the continuation of the participation of Bosnia and Herzegovina military and police in missions in the Congo, Mali, Afghanistan, Liberia, South Sudan and Cyprus.

Bosnia and Herzegovina signs border treaty with Montenegro

41. In a welcome development, at its session on 23 July, the Presidency adopted the State Border Treaty between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, which was signed by the two States at a ceremony in Vienna on 26 August. The Border Treaty now needs to be ratified. I hope this positive development will help to accelerate efforts to secure border treaties with Bosnia and Herzegovina's other neighbours.

B. Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina

42. The Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to convene on a regular basis, holding 23 regular and 4 urgent sessions during the reporting period. The Council of Ministers advanced European Union-related issues, adopting the European Union Reform Agenda, a draft decision on the European Union Coordination Mechanism and the Action Plan for the implementation of the ruling in *Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*. The Council of Ministers also managed to adopt multi-year strategic documents in the justice sector, on transportation policy, and on combatting terrorism, corruption and domestic violence. Playing its role to support economic development, the Council of Ministers successfully participated in the summit on the Western Balkans, held in Vienna on 27 August, where it won support for a number of projects. Additionally,

its members were active in preparing the 27 Bosnia and Herzegovina institutions to address the global migrant crisis. Officials of the Council of Ministers successfully overcame obstacles in the export of milk from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union, and harmonized legislation on money-laundering and the financing of terrorism and procedures to avoid enhanced measures by international financial institutions.

43. In terms of legislation, while the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina workplan for 2015 envisioned the adoption of 65 legislative proposals by the end of 2015, the Council of Ministers has so far adopted only four new laws and five sets of amendments to existing legislation.[5]

C. Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina

44. The House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina held eight regular sessions, while the Bosnia and Herzegovina House of Peoples held seven regular sessions during the reporting period. While the legislative output of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina improved slightly, with three new laws and six amendments to existing legislation adopted, results continue to fall short of expectations.[6] Following up on the adoption, on 23 February, of the Written Commitment on European Union Reforms, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted, on 17 September, the Reform Agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2015-2018 as a framework document.

45. Following months of dispute, the appointment of the Joint Parliamentary Committee for Oversight over the Work of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Intelligence Agency was completed in June. On 27 August, the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina also appointed members of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Parliamentary Board for Stabilization and Association between the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament.

46. Following the rotation of the chair of the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina in August 2015, SNSD delegates resumed full participation in the work of the House, following months of regular plenary walk-outs. I welcome their return to work.

Amendments to the Election Law

47. The new inter-agency working group, established under the auspices of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to propose improvements to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Election Law, held its first two sessions in October.

[5] The budget for 2015, the Law on Asylum, the Law on Foreigners and the Law on Non-Working Days during Religious Holidays, as well as amendments to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Criminal Code, the Law on Misdemeanors, the Law on Consumer Protection, the Law on Salaries and Allowances in Bosnia and Herzegovina Institutions and the Law on Associations and Foundations.

[6] The budget for 2015, the Law on Custom Policy, the Law on Obligations in Civilian Navigation, as well as amendments to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Criminal Code, the Law on the Public Broadcasting System, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Residence Law, the Law on Salaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina Institutions, the Law on Misdemeanors and the Law on Personal Identification Number.

Appointment of the new Bosnia and Herzegovina Ombudsmen for Human Rights

48. In October, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Joint Committee for conducting the appointment of Bosnia and Herzegovina's three Ombudsmen for Human Rights interviewed 17 candidates. The selection process was conducted transparently, with the involvement of civil society, and the ranking of candidates was submitted to the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina for final appointment.

IV. Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Breakdown of the Federation coalition

49. The governing coalition in the Federation unravelled in May over a dispute between the DF party and HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina about party control of public companies. HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina ministers boycotted two sessions over the issue, and on 4 June, the Federation government adopted a controversial decree on the exercise of powers in companies in which the Federation has an ownership stake, transferring authorities previously exercised by individual ministers to the government as a whole. In reaction, DF announced that the party would withdraw from the coalition by not attending government sessions, while DF ministers would remain in office until officially dismissed. Federation Vice-President Milan Dunović (DF) filed a request before the Federation Constitutional Court for the review of the constitutionality of the decree of 4 June. The government continued to hold sessions, as the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina ministers have a quorum to take decisions, even without DF. On 12 June, four DF ministers (Minister of Energy, Mining and Industry, Minister of Trade, Minister of Labour and Social Policy, and Minister of Environment and Tourism) submitted their resignations to the Federation President, Marinko Čavara (HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina). On 15 June, Federation President Čavara accepted the resignation of the Minister of Energy but not those of the other DF ministers. On 15 September, the Federation President accepted the resignation of a second DF minister, the Minister of Environment and Tourism.

50. Despite the coalition problems, the Federation Government held 25 regular and 14 extraordinary sessions during the reporting period, adopting 6 new laws and amendments to 27 existing laws. The Federation Parliament was less active, with the Federation House of Representatives holding two regular and three extraordinary sessions during the reporting period, adopting 3 new laws and amendments to 11 existing laws. The Federation House of Peoples held three regular sessions and three extraordinary sessions during the reporting period, adopting 9 new laws and amendments to 16 existing laws.

51. The Federation authorities deserve praise for having succeeded in adopting the new Federation Labour Law, a significant reform foreseen under the Reform Agenda.

52. On 20 August, the Federation government discussed the no-confidence motion against the government proposed on 15 July by Federation House of Peoples delegates from DF, the Party for a Better Future (SBB), SNSD, Nasa Stranka and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). On 30 September, the motion was defeated in the House.

53. Ever since DF left the coalition, the Federation government has been in effect a minority government relying on votes in the Federation Parliament from parties

that are not part of the ruling coalition. In the light of this, SDA and HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina have been actively seeking new coalition partners. On 19 October SDA and SBB signed a coalition agreement on joint action at all levels of government. At the time of this writing, the new coalition members appear to be SBB, the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) and the Activist Democratic Party (A-SDA), which, together with SDA and HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina, have 62 of the 98 delegates in the Federation House of Representatives.

Mostar

54. No concrete progress was made during the reporting period to implement the ruling of 2010 by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitutional Court on the Mostar electoral system. The City has no functioning City Council, the Mayor of Mostar continues in a caretaker capacity and the citizens of Mostar continue to be denied their basic right to elect local representatives. In June, 10 opposition political parties, gathered under the name Initiative for Mostar, initiated talks, which are ongoing, in an attempt to facilitate a breakthrough. Local officials from SDA and HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina also restarted their talks in October.

55. The budget for 2015 for Mostar was proclaimed on 8 May, and published in the Mostar City *Official Gazette* on 11 May. It amounts to BAM 51.2 million, which is a decrease of 9.7 per cent compared with the budget for 2014.

V. Republika Srpska

56. The reporting period in the Republika Srpska has been dominated by the steps taken by the Republika Srpska authorities regarding the announced referendum and political attacks on representatives in the Bosnia and Herzegovina institutions from the Republika Srpska for alleged betrayal of its interests. On 4 September these attacks took on a menacing character when the Republika Srpska President, Milorad Dodik, threatened to have legislation adopted that would introduce the crime of treason in the Republika Srpska for State-level officials coming from the Republika Srpska. I want to make clear that State-level officials are independent, with their own clearly defined rights and responsibilities and are not bound by orders or instructions coming from lower-level authorities.

57. The Republika Srpska President has also continued to make statements denying genocide, reiterating his view that what happened in Srebrenica was not genocide but rather a grave crime.[7]

58. During the reporting period the Republika Srpska government held 26 regular sessions. The Republika Srpska National Assembly has held four regular and three special sessions. During the reporting period, it adopted 10 new laws and amendments to 14 existing laws.

59. The Republika Srpska authorities have continued their policy of attempting to further regulate activities of civil society and public expression. On 21 May, the Republika Srpska National Assembly removed the controversial Law on Transparency of the Work of the Non-Governmental Organization Sector and the Law on Public Gathering from the session's agenda, following strong criticism by the opposition and

[7] *Večernje Novosti*, 26 May 2015.

the non-governmental organization sector, which saw the legislation as a form of pressure against them. These two laws were seen as connected to the Law on Public Peace and Order, which the Republika Srpska authorities adopted on 5 February. This law defines the Internet and social networks as "public space", putting them under regulation by the law.

Non-cooperation with the High Representative

60. The Republika Srpska authorities have continued their policy of denying the High Representative access to official information and documents required to fulfil his mandate. Under annex 10 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace, all authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are obliged to fully cooperate with the High Representative as well as with the international organizations and agencies as provided for in article IX of the Agreement. The practice of the Republika Srpska government not to provide information and documents requested by the Office of the High Representative goes back to 2007. Repeated calls by the Peace Implementation Council reminding them of their obligation to ensure that the High Representative has full access to documents in a timely fashion have had no impact. This policy contradicts the frequent claim that the Republika Srpska respects the letter of the Agreement.

61. The reporting period has also seen an escalation of verbal attacks on the Office of the High Representative and the High Representative in particular. Statements include challenges to the executive authorities of the High Representative, derogatory descriptions of the Office, and personal insults against the staff of the Office and the High Representative.

VI. Entrenching the rule of law

62. The European Union-led Structured Dialogue on Justice continued during the reporting period in the shadow of the announced referendum in the Republika Srpska on the State judicial institutions and the authorities of the High Representative.

Justice Sector Reform Strategy

63. On a more positive note, on 8 September, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina finally adopted the new Justice Sector Reform Strategy for 2014-2018. The adoption followed a new round of consultations between the entities, the Brcko District and the State, after the Republika Srpska asked for certain changes to the text previously agreed and adopted by the Federation and the Brcko District in 2014.

Anti-corruption efforts

64. The implementation of legislation adopted by the Federation in July 2014 to create a special prosecutors' department for corruption is still delayed. While officially in force, the legislation cannot be applied because of a lack of allocated budgetary resources. As a result, corruption prosecutions in the Federation might cease altogether, owing to legal uncertainty about jurisdiction. The Federation Government should either enable the new law to be applied, or put it out of force and revert to the old jurisdictional arrangement.

Prosecution of war crimes

65. The Supervisory Board for the Implementation of the War Crimes Prosecution Strategy continues to meet regularly, with the backlog of cases in the prosecutor's offices being systematically reduced. The Board concluded that the goal of reduction of war crimes cases in the prosecutors' offices by 15 per cent by 30 June 2015 had been met.

66. On 10 September, the Ministers of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation, and the Republika Srpska, and the Brcko District Judicial Commission President signed the "Protocol on the outcome of the ministerial meeting in the framework of the European Union-Bosnia and Herzegovina Structured Dialogue on Justice", in which they stated that the national War Crimes Prosecution Strategy should be revised in order to identify new feasible deadlines for its implementation and to enhance the monitoring role of the Supervisory Board.

VII. Public security and law enforcement, including intelligence reform

67. The practice of political interference in operational policing remains a serious challenge and has continued through the delaying of appointments of police directors and the formation of the independent boards which select them. The appointment of the Director of the Federation Administration of Police is still pending owing to an ongoing court dispute over the validity of an already conducted selection process. The appointments of new police commissioners in West Herzegovina Canton and Canton 10 are outstanding. The appointments of independent selection boards have been delayed in Posavina, Tuzla and Bosnian-Podrinje cantons.

68. New internal affairs legislation in Bosnian-Podrinje Canton was adopted in June 2015. Similarly, a new Sarajevo Canton Law on Internal Affairs was adopted by the Cantonal Assembly in first reading in May 2015. New police official legislation was adopted by the Federation Government in the first reading in August 2015 and awaits parliamentary procedure.

69. The Office of the High Representative continues to monitor changes to police legislation and encourage its harmonization in jurisdictions throughout the country.

Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism

70. On 18 September, the Council of Europe's Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) lifted its Public Statement of 14 April 2014 on Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereby it had called upon States to advise their financial institutions to apply enhanced due diligence measures to transactions involving Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Statement was lifted after the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly passed amendments to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Criminal Code, as recommended by MONEYVAL. For the same reason, Bosnia and Herzegovina was also removed from the MONEYVAL Compliance Enhancing Procedures.

Amendments to the Law on Temporary and Permanent Residence

71. In July, the Bosnia and Herzegovina House of Peoples adopted amendments to the Law on Temporary and Permanent Residence, which provide for more thorough verification of residence applications. In August, members of the Bosniak Caucus in the House of Peoples requested an assessment of the constitutionality of the law from the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitutional Court. The Court has not yet issued a ruling.

Removal of the Director of the State Investigation and Protection Agency

72. In August, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina dismissed the Director of the State Investigation and Protection Agency, Goran Zubac, after the Bosnia and Herzegovina Court confirmed a first-instance guilty ruling against him for lack of commitment in office in relation to the non-deployment of the Agency during the riots of 7 February 2014 in Sarajevo. A new selection and appointment process for the Director post is under way.

VIII. Economy

Economic indicators

73. Compared with the same period in 2014, the available economic indicators for 2015 are encouraging. In the first eight months of the year, Bosnia and Herzegovina registered a 4.9 per cent increase in exports, a 0.2 per cent decrease in imports and a consequent 6.2 per cent decrease in its foreign trade deficit. Industrial production in July increased by 2.3 per cent over the same month in 2014. The price level was lower by 1.1 per cent than a year ago. Continued increases were registered in indirect tax revenue collection. In the period from January to August, Bosnia and Herzegovina collected BAM 4.140 billion from indirect taxes, which is 3.5 per cent, or BAM 143 million, more than the same period in 2014. Positive trends in foreign trade and indirect tax revenue collection are expected to continue in 2015. Growth projections for the year by international financial institutions are positive and range around 1.9 per cent.

74. Other available indicators are similar to those for 2014. The average net monthly salary in July amounted to BAM 838, only a 0.2 per cent increase, while the average pension in June amounted to BAM 358, an increase of 1.4 per cent from June 2014. The minimum pension in the Republika Srpska is BAM 174 and BAM 326 in the Federation. Retirees are among the most vulnerable segments of the population, not only because of low pension levels but also owing to a continued increase in the number of retired persons, which is not matched by a corresponding number of employed contributors. In the Republika Srpska, the number of retirees has already exceeded the number of employed, while in the Federation, the number of employed is marginally higher. An additional problem for the sustainability of the entity pension funds is their low rate of collection of contributions.

75. Unemployment levels remain a major concern. At the end of July, there were 542,936 unemployed persons — a decrease of 1 per cent compared with the same period in 2014 — and the administrative unemployment rate was still about 44 per cent. The share of youth in total unemployment is about 60 per cent. Also discouraging are foreign direct investment levels. According to the Bosnia and

Herzegovina Central Bank, foreign direct investment in the first quarter of 2015 amounted to BAM 84.7 million, a decrease of 77.6 per cent compared with 2014.

76. Bosnia and Herzegovina's credit and business ratings have slightly improved. Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed the "B" credit rating of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its stable outlook on 11 September, based on the expectation of continued international financial assistance to the country, which balances identified deficiencies and risks such as fragile, overlapping institutions, weak fiscal management and so forth. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development *World Investment Report 2015* ranked Bosnia and Herzegovina fourth by foreign direct investment inflows in 2014 in the region of South-East Europe. The Fraser Institute publication *Economic Freedom of the World: 2015 Annual Report* lifts Bosnia and Herzegovina up from 85th to 78th place of 157 countries and places it for the first time in the company of economically freer countries.

Fiscal issues

77. The overall fiscal situation is somewhat better than in 2014, thanks to a continued increase in indirect tax revenue collection and reduced foreign debt payment obligations. Still, substantial fiscal challenges remain, also owing to the absence of international financial assistance.

78. Concerns about increasing public debt remain. According to the "Information on the state of the public debt of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 31 December 2014", prepared by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Finance and Treasury, total public debt amounts to BAM 11.5 billion, of which the foreign debt is BAM 8.2 billion and the domestic debt is BAM 3.3 billion. This means that total public debt in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014 increased by BAM 1.089 billion, or 10.44 per cent.

79. Broken down by entity, the Federation public debt at the end of 2014 amounted to BAM 6.36 billion (foreign: 5.25 billion; domestic: 1.10 billion), while the Republika Srpska public debt amounted to BAM 5.05 billion (foreign: 2.89 billion; domestic: 2.16 billion). It is also worth noting that the Republika Srpska share in the total domestic debt is estimated at 65.75 per cent, with the Federation share at 33.63 per cent, and the Brcko District at 0.63 per cent.

80. The continuing trend of indebtedness of the "General Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (which includes all levels of government, social welfare funds and public road directorates) was also noted in the "Information on fiscal sustainability of Bosnia and Herzegovina", prepared by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Directorate for Economic Planning. According to the information, the verified public debt at the end of 2014 reached 42.2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). The situation is worse in the Republika Srpska, where the government sector debt reached 60 per cent of GDP, while in the Federation such debt is estimated at 38.8 per cent. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Directorate for Economic Planning warned that the high indebtedness of the Republika Srpska could jeopardize the overall fiscal sustainability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Growing public debt throughout the country led to an increase in debt servicing obligations, which reached 12 per cent of budget revenues in 2014. This is four times more than at the beginning of 2008. An increase in debt servicing obligations is particularly evident with regard to domestic debt. Although domestic debt accounts only for one third of the total debt, the amount needed for its servicing in 2014 was almost equal to the amount needed for servicing the external debt.

81. Owing to the pace of government formation, the Law on the Budget of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Institutions and International Obligations for 2015 (State budget) was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina only on 18 May. It amounts to BAM 1.563 billion, which is a 13 per cent decrease from 2014. Of this amount, BAM 613 million is planned for servicing the foreign debt, which is a 28 per cent decrease compared with 2014, while BAM 950 million goes to financing the Bosnia and Herzegovina institutions. The amount available for financing the Bosnia and Herzegovina institutions, of which BAM 750 million comes from indirect tax revenue, has been locked at the same level for four consecutive years. On the basis of the Global Framework of Fiscal Balance and Policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2016-2018 that sets a budget framework of the Bosnia and Herzegovina institutions for the relevant period, the amount for financing the institutions, including the amount they receive from indirect tax revenue, is unlikely to increase over the next three years. While this does not pose a risk to the functioning of the Bosnia and Herzegovina institutions, it does raise questions concerning the fulfilment of their obligations, including those relevant for the European Union and NATO.

82. Both entity budgets show significant reliance on international and domestic borrowing: 27.5 per cent of the total amount in the Federation budget for 2015 and 21.8 per cent of the total amount in the Republika Srpska budget for 2015. Fiscal pressures have additionally increased, owing to the absence of international financial disbursements caused by the failure to meet commitments under the IMF Standby Arrangement that expired on 30 June. Those were somewhat mitigated by stable indirect tax revenues and domestic borrowing through the issuance of government securities. However, both entities are looking into alternative financing options to cover the budget gap that should have been covered by international financial assistance, and in this regard both will have to rebalance their budgets for 2015. While the Federation Parliament adopted a rebalanced budget on 9 October, substituting IMF funds with domestic borrowing, to date the Republika Srpska has taken no steps towards rebalancing its budget. This points to the need for renewed negotiations with international financial institutions, primarily IMF, on a new financial arrangement. Initial discussions between Bosnia and Herzegovina and IMF have already been conducted, but IMF approval of any future arrangement with Bosnia and Herzegovina will depend on the country's progress in meeting a number of prior actions, including some of the outstanding requirements from the previous Standby Arrangement. One of those is the new Labour Law, which the Federation adopted on 30 July and the Republika Srpska has yet to adopt.

83. The fiscal situation at the cantonal level in the Federation improved in the first six months of 2015 compared with the same period in 2014. The reasons for improvement included a 12 per cent increase in domestic revenue, a 3 per cent decrease in total expenditures and spending limits in the first quarter of the year owing to temporary financing. A comparison of the consolidated budget execution reports for the first half of 2014 and 2015 shows that the cantonal budgets in 2015 recorded a surplus of BAM 84.9 million, while in 2014 they had a deficit of BAM 42.7 million. These are positive developments, as the cantons are of key importance for the fiscal and social stability of the Federation and the State. Despite this, the Federation has been trying to secure additional funds to meet shortfalls in revenue.

84. The situation is particularly difficult in the capital city of Sarajevo, where city financing was never adequately regulated. Amendments to the Law on Allocation of

Public Revenues of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 2014 omitted the city, and, as a consequence, the city has not received any indirect tax revenue since then. To remedy the situation, the High Representative wrote to the Chair of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the Federation and Sarajevo Canton Prime Ministers on 16 September and requested that an appropriate legal solution be put in place without delay that would secure both the status and the issue of financing for the City of Sarajevo, in a fair and sustainable manner. The Office of the High Representative has also engaged with the relevant authorities to identify and adopt an interim solution that would provide immediate financing, thereby ensuring the continued functioning of the City until the problem is resolved more systemically.

International obligations

85. The adoption by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the Framework Transport Policy for the period 2015-2030 on 30 July set sustainable transport development as a crucial element of the overall economic development of the country. Its adoption was an important prerequisite for access by Bosnia and Herzegovina to available financing in 2015.

86. On 23 September, the Energy Community Ministerial Council declared Bosnia and Herzegovina in persistent breach of its Energy Community Treaty obligations in the gas sector and discussed the possibility of sanctions should progress not be made by its next meeting in 2015. In the absence of progress on a law regulating the gas sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina that would bring it in line with its obligations, the Energy Community Ministerial Council decided, on 16 October, to suspend the right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in certain decision-making procedures falling under the treaty, and to suspend reimbursement for Bosnia and Herzegovina representatives at meetings of the Energy Community. The Council also invited the European Union to take appropriate measures for the suspension of financial support granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the sectors covered by the Energy Community Treaty. According to the decision of the Council, the effect of the sanctions is limited to one year upon its adoption and will be subject to review at the next meeting of the Ministerial Council in 2016. The required law has not been adopted owing to continued opposition of the Republika Srpska authorities to the regulation of certain aspects of the gas sector at the State level and the designation of a State regulator for gas.

IX. Return of refugees and displaced persons

87. Upholding the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their pre-war homes remains central to the full implementation of annex 7 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace, which requires State- and entity-level authorities "to create in their territories the political, economic, and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, without preference for any particular group".

88. While the provision of appropriate accommodation for displaced persons remains essential, an environment that is conducive for sustainable return is equally important and requires the full implementation of the return strategy that was adopted by the authorities in 2012. In this respect, I remain particularly concerned about the difficulties that continue to arise in the education sector in several

returnee communities, not least the ongoing dispute regarding the use and name of official languages primarily in the education system in the Republika Srpska, but also in a number of cantons in the Federation, which is causing unnecessary difficulties for pupils and parents.

X. Media developments

89. Efforts to establish an independent and viable public broadcasting system in Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to encounter difficulties, not least due to the long-running failure to establish the Public Broadcasting System Corporation to facilitate cooperation among the three public broadcasters.

90. The ongoing failure of the Public Broadcasting System Board to register the Corporation has also undermined the changeover from analogue to digital terrestrial broadcasting. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Communications and Transport purchased equipment for the first phase of digitalization, but the Republika Srpska public broadcaster conditioned its transfer and installation on the transfer of the ownership rights to the individual broadcasting services. On 3 August 2015, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a decision transferring ownership rights over specified digitalization equipment to individual broadcasting services. On 1 October 2015, the Ministry of Communications and Transport and the three public broadcasters signed a contract that regulates this matter further, and appears to be unblocking the digitalization process.

91. I remain concerned about the financial sustainability of the public broadcasting system as interim contracts for collecting the radio-television tax with telecom operators expire at the end of the year, and there is no indication that a new method for collecting the tax is close to agreement.

92. The Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina still has not appointed a new director to the State-level Communications Regulatory Agency, which regulates and oversees public and private electronic media (television and radio) throughout the country. This appointment appears to be blocked owing to political negotiations over appointments to other State institutions. The eight-year failure to appoint a new director continues to have a detrimental effect on the functioning of the Agency.

XI. Defence matters

93. The pace of the disposal of ammunition, weapons and explosives stockpiles has improved, but remains relatively slow. The risk of accidental explosion remains, owing to ageing stockpiles and poor storage conditions. An agreement to establish a mechanism through which surplus stockpiles could be sold remains out of reach, and this method of disposal remains a concern given the poor quality of the material in question.

XII. European Union military force

94. The European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) continues to play an important role in supporting the efforts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to maintain a safe and secure environment. This, in turn, assists my

Office and other international organizations to fulfil their respective mandates. The presence of EUFOR on the ground, including through its liaison and observation teams, remains an important contribution to stability and security.

XIII. Future of the Office of the High Representative

95. The political directors of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board met in Sarajevo on 9 and 10 June 2015 to underline their unequivocal commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Steering Board also reinforced the need to complete the 5+2 agenda, which remains necessary for the closure of the Office of the High Representative. The next meeting of the Steering Board is scheduled to take place on 1 and 2 December 2015.

96. Since the beginning of my mandate in March 2009, the budget of the Office has been reduced by over 44 per cent and my staff by over 51 per cent. Given these deep cuts, it remains essential that I am equipped with the budget and staff required to carry out my mandate effectively, as I am entitled to under annex 10 to the Peace Agreement.

XIV. Reporting schedule

97. In keeping with the proposals of my predecessor to submit regular reports for onward transmission to the Security Council, as required by Council resolution 1031 (1995), I herewith present my fourteenth regular report. Should the Secretary-General or any Security Council member require information at any other time, I would be pleased to provide an additional written update. The next regular report to the Secretary-General is scheduled for April 2016.

United Nations S/2015/842

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 November 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 5 November 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith a press release by the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Nkosazana D. Zuma, on the positive developments regarding the implementation of the September 2012 Cooperation Agreement between the Sudan and South Sudan (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Omer Dahab Fadl **Mohamed**
Permanent Representative

15-19362 (E) 061115

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 5 November 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The African Union welcomes the progress being made in the implementation of the September 2012 Cooperation Agreement between the Sudan and South Sudan

14 October 2015

The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Dr. Nkosazana D. Zuma, welcomes the recent progress made in the implementation of the September 2012 Cooperation Agreement between the Sudan and South Sudan, concluded under the auspices of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel. In this respect, she notes with satisfaction the successful conclusion of the extraordinary meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism held in Addis Ababa from 13 to 14 October 2015 under the auspices of the Implementation Panel. In the decisions signed at the end of the meeting, the parties notably accepted the map and the centre-line proposed by the Implementation Panel to facilitate the establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone. The parties also agreed on a number of steps to improve the working methods of the Mechanism subcommittees, to ensure that all other outstanding issues are effectively addressed.

The Chairperson of the Commission commends the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan for their renewed commitment to the full implementation of the September 2012 Cooperation Agreement. She also expresses appreciation to the African Union High-level Implementation Panel for its tireless efforts towards assisting the two countries in their quest for peace.

The successful convening of the extraordinary session of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism follows the holding in Addis Ababa, from 6 to 8 October 2015, of the 4th meeting of the Joint Boundary Commission between the Sudan and South Sudan, under the facilitation of the African Union Border Programme. The meeting of the Commission concluded successfully, with the parties agreeing on specific steps to expedite the demarcation of their common border, in particular the preparation of a demarcation plan, including a budget for the entire exercise, and the acceleration of the opening of an escrow account for the funding of this process.

The decisions reached by the Joint Political and Security Mechanism and the resolutions of the Joint Boundary Commission lay a solid foundation towards achieving sustainable peace between the two countries. They will also have a positive effect in the search for peace in South Sudan. The Chairperson reaffirms the African Union's unwavering support to the two countries in their efforts to build two viable States living side by side in peace and cooperating on all issues of mutual interest.

United Nations S/2015/843

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 November 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 9 November 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Lithuania to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the representative of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces dated 9 November 2015 (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Raimonda **Murmokaitė**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-19570 (E) 101115

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 9 November 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Lithuania to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces has consistently supported efforts to achieve a political transition in Syria, and we continue to work to achieve a resolution to the crisis in Syria through the path set out in the Geneva communiqué. Ongoing discussions in Vienna to bring about an end to the violence in Syria may yet help to provide a pathway to peace and democracy. But for the talks in Vienna to have any hope of success, the protection of Syrian civilians must be guaranteed.

Approximately 1,000 civilians die every month in Syria. Five Syrian children are killed every day, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights. As the Secretary-General stated to the Security Council on 30 September 2015, "We need to take urgent measures to protect civilians from widespread violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. We have an obligation to the Syrian people." This is an obligation that is as incumbent upon the participants of talks in Vienna as it is upon the United Nations and the rest of the international community. The notable absence of any Syrians in Vienna risks taking talks in an unhelpful direction, where the essential wants and needs of Syrians themselves are ignored.

A political process in Syria begins and ends with Syrians. This was confirmed in the Vienna communiqué of 30 October, Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and the Geneva communiqué of June 2012. As these documents clearly stipulate, only when there is Syrian support and trust will a peaceful settlement be reached.

The key to winning Syrians' confidence lies in civilian protection. Over the past several months, the Syrian people have been perfectly clear: civilian protection must be at the core of any political process aimed at resolving the crisis. Failure to take measures to protect civilians will make efforts to achieve a political solution impossible and will lack the buy-in of Syrians themselves. As we saw in Geneva, peace talks that take place while Syrian civilians are being slaughtered will fail to earn the legitimacy required to forge a political deal capable of resolving the crisis.

For the Vienna process to stand a chance of winning the support of Syrians, the allies of the Syrian people must provide clear guarantees that Syrian civilians will be protected, in particular from indiscriminate aerial bombardment, which remains the foremost killer of Syrian civilians, responsible for 62 per cent of all civilian deaths in October 2015. The implementation of a no-bombing zone would stem the killing in Syria, slow the exodus that prompts the refugee crisis and lay the foundation towards a political solution to the crisis.

Syrians insist on and deserve protection. If Member States are serious about ending the crisis in Syria, Syrian voices must be heard in Vienna and their perspective prioritized above all others.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative
of the Syrian National Coalition
to the United Nations

United Nations S/2015/844

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 November 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 5 November 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, as President of the Security Council for the month of November, the United Kingdom has scheduled a briefing on 13 November to hear from heads of police components, under the item "Peacekeeping operations".

In order to help steer the discussion on the subject, the United Kingdom has prepared the attached concept note (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the concept note attached could be c culated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Matthew **Rycroft**

15-19369 (E) 061115

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Annex to the letter dated 5 November 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note for the Security Council briefing on the challenges of policing within a protection of civilians mandate, 13 November 2015

1. Introduction

As President of the Security Council for November, the United Kingdom will convene a briefing from the heads of police components of United Nations peacekeeping missions. This initiative will expand upon the first Council session ever dedicated to policing issues and the resolution on policing issues, championed by the Australian presidency on 20 November 2014.[1] The briefing will allow Council members an opportunity to explore the complex challenges faced by police commanders, individual police officers and specialist police teams or formed police units working within a protection of civilians mandate.

2. Background

The United Nations has been deploying police officers to peacekeeping operations since 1960, traditionally conducting monitoring, observing and reporting tasks. Since the early 1990s, that role has expanded to include mentoring and training functions that are vital to helping establish or restore the rule of law. This widening of the role reflects the importance given to policing during international efforts to maintain law and order in States transitioning from conflict to peace and stability. All United Nations peace operations today also have the obligation to "advocate the protection of civilians".[2] This added complexity has changed the way policing must be planned and implemented across the full spectrum of peacekeeping operations. Police are regularly at the forefront of engagement with the population, if not the first face of the United Nations, and initiatives such as community policing help to establish trust and understanding between the United Nations mission and the community it is protecting. This is one of the areas where increasing women's representation in police presences is crucial in order to ensure women's needs and perspectives, including survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, can be addressed.

Police play a central part in the protection of civilians mandate within a peacekeeping operation, in particular protection from physical violence and establishing a protection environment, including respect for the rule of law and human rights. Monitoring and reporting by police through patrols and observation provide an immediate deterrent effect, data to inform prevention and evidence to tackle impunity. Effective cooperation between police officers and rule of law, human rights, women and child protection actors supports the overall protection of civilians strategy.

[1] Resolution 2185 (2014).
[2] A/70/357-S/2015/682, para. 17.

3. Briefing from heads of police components

This briefing will allow the Security Council the rare opportunity to listen to the heads of police components of selected United Nations peacekeeping operations on their activities in the field, including the challenges they face in implementing their protection of civilians mandates. This briefing follows on from Security Council resolution 2185 (2014) and it is hoped that it will become an annual feature of the Council's calendar. The format will directly mirror that of the annual briefing from heads of military components. The three United Nations police commissioners briefing have been chosen because of the unique policing challenges within their missions. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations has also been invited to make a short presentation.

- **Overview and challenges facing United Nations police components**: Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
- **Protection of civilians**: Police Commissioner of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan
- **Protection of civilians**: Police Commissioner of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- **Protection of civilians**: Police Commissioner of the United Nations Mission in Liberia

Following these briefings, the floor will be opened to give Council members an opportunity to raise questions. The briefers will have the opportunity to respond.

4. Issues for consideration

Security Council members may wish to consider addressing the following issues in their remarks:

- **Protection of civilians**: What is unique about the contributions of United Nations police components and individual police officers to the protection of civilians? How do individual police officers work and coordinate with United Nations protection actors (the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Human Rights Officers, Gender Advisers and Child Protection and Women Protection Advisers) and how do they differentiate their roles with the civilians they encounter? What are examples of good practice of United Nations police using their comparative advantage and relationship with national police to strengthen the rule of law and human rights protection, such as ensuring prosecutions and improving security?
- **Command and control, and resourcing**: What challenges are faced in the context of command and control? Are police components correctly equipped and resourced to carry out their protection of civilians mandate?
- **Women police and community engagement**: What efforts are made to increase the number of women in police contingents, ensuring that they have the appropriate facilities and support? How closely do police units interact with communities, including women, to assess ongoing threats and required responses?
- **Training, skills and equipment**: What more can the Security Council do, including through scripting protection of civilians mandates, to help police in their difficult role? Do current training materials and policies provide sufficient

guidance for police officers on their protection of civilians role? Do current protection of civilians strategies clearly delineate the responsibilities of police officers? How is training for police on sexual and gender-based violence and child protection developed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations being made available and applied?

5. Outcome

No Security Council product is foreseen.

6. Procedural aspects

As with the briefings from Force Commanders, the intention is for this meeting of the Security Council to be as interactive as possible. The briefers are expecting to respond to questions and Council members are similarly encouraged to engage in debate on those responses should they wish to. To that end, initial statements from Council members that are shorter than the suggested five minutes would facilitate subsequent interaction and allow time for more exchanges.

United Nations S/2015/845

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 November 2015

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Letter dated 5 November 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, as President of the Security Council for the month of November 2015, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has scheduled an open debate on 17 November on the subject "security, development and the root causes of conflict" in connection with the item "Maintenance of international peace and security".

To help to steer the discussion on the subject, the United Kingdom has prepared a concept note (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Matthew **Rycroft**

15-19370 (E) 091115

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 5 November 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note for the open debate of the Security Council to be held on 17 November 2015 on the subject "Maintenance of international peace and security: security, development and the root causes of conflict"

1. Introduction

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will hold a ministerial-level open debate of the Security Council on 17 November on the topic of security, development and the root causes of conflict, in connection with the item "Maintenance of international peace and security".

2. Context

At the summit to adopt the Sustainable Development Goals in September 2015, Heads of State and Government recognized that "sustainable development cannot be realized without peace and security; and peace and security will be at risk without sustainable development" (General Assembly resolution 70/1, para. 35). This builds on the similar reference in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, in which it was acknowledged that "peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being" and recognized that "development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing" (General Assembly resolution 60/1, para. 9). This was expressed memorably in the report of the Secretary-General entitled "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all", as follows: "we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights" (A/59/2005, para. 17).

This year, Heads of State and Government also pledged that "we must redouble our efforts to resolve or prevent conflict and to support post-conflict countries, including through ensuring that women have a role in peace-building and State-building" (General Assembly resolution 70/1, para. 35).

Sustained peace and inclusive societies go hand in hand, reinforcing the links between security and development and requiring a deep analysis of the root causes of conflict in the interests of preventing conflict and preventing relapses into conflict. Some of the building blocks of inclusive and peaceful societies include access to justice for all, effective, accountable and inclusive institutions and the promotion of the rule of law. Helping States to develop their own capacities for reducing illicit arms and financial flows, combating organized crime and reducing corruption can also contribute in this regard. In addition, developing effective, accountable and transparent institutions, protecting fundamental freedoms and strengthening institutions to prevent violence, crime and violent extremism can also be considered essential building blocks for peaceful societies. A lack in these areas

can amount to contributing factors when analysing the root causes of particular conflicts.

In the statement by the President of the Security Council of 11 February 2011 (S/PRST/2011/4), the Council underlined that "security and development are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing and key to attaining sustainable peace". In the same statement, the Council reiterated that, "in order to support a country to emerge sustainably from conflict, there is a need for a comprehensive and integrated approach that incorporates and strengthens coherence between political, security, development, human rights and rule of law activities, and addresses the underlying causes of each conflict".

Working to break down silos

The link between the three pillars of the United Nations — development, peace and security and human rights — in the pursuit of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war and allowing all to flourish, in larger freedom, is clearer than ever before. Each part of the United Nations system plays its individual role in pursuing these goals. To respond to the current challenges facing the world, it is more important than ever before that all parts of the United Nations system, and the Member States, recognize and take account of the links between these pillars and the need to work coherently across these boundaries.

The importance of working across the United Nations system for prevention was brought out clearly in the report of the Secretary-General entitled "The United Nations and conflict prevention: a collective recommitment" (S/2015/730). The report is a stark reminder of the challenges that we face today in effective prevention, and the consequences of inaction. Prevention has been a repeated and key theme of the reviews conducted in 2015: the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446); the report of the Secretary-General entitled "The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations" (A/70/357-S/2015/682); the report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture Review (A/69/968-S/2015/490); and the global study on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).

The Council has a key role to play in prevention. Breaking down silos across the development, peace and security and human rights pillars is central to supporting prevention efforts. Doing so will have positive effects on all three pillars. In some situations, these efforts can be regarded as peacebuilding, an area in which the Council is already actively engaged through, for example, mandates that authorize activity in security sector reform, the rule of law, justice sector reform, constitution-making, electoral reform and support. United Nations missions also have the ability to undertake quick-impact projects precisely to bridge the gap between stabilization and development. Peacebuilding has to be viewed as an inherently political and long-term process that must be supported to avoid relapse into conflict. The Secretary-General set out in his report (S/2015/730) how the United Nations system is already active and joined up on a range of these issues and will continue to support the inter-agency Task Team on Conflict Prevention, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-Department of Political Affairs Joint Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention and wider

UNDP work, such as parliamentary strengthening programmes. The Peacebuilding Commission is also active in these areas and briefs the Council on country-specific situations.

The Secretary-General also noted, in his report on the future of United Nations peace operations (A/70/357-S/2015/682), his intention to engage the broader United Nations system, in his capacity as Chair of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, on how the United Nations system can collectively strengthen its conflict prevention and peacebuilding work.

Role of the Council

In the debate, the United Kingdom invites participants to explore how the Council can play its part to the fullest extent possible in further breaking down silos. Understanding that security, development and the root causes of conflict are inextricably linked opens up space for a valuable debate. The goal of that debate is to understand more deeply the shared objectives that cut across the security-development spectrum, and which require joined-up action in both the security and development areas to be effective. Peacebuilding activities and working to build inclusive and peaceful societies can be regarded as two sides of the same conflict prevention coin. Both can include working towards accountable institutions, reducing violence and corruption and protecting fundamental freedoms. Both work to support national ownership and leadership and to re-establish the primary responsibility of national authorities and build capacities to prevent conflict.

The Council's responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security. The global goals are universal. As set out above, there are overlaps and areas of shared interest. There is also a requirement for mutual support where development concerns touch on matters of international peace and security. This helps to narrow the focus of the debate. In situations of conflict or post-conflict, and in situations in which the Council seeks to support prevention efforts, participants are invited to consider how the development tools could and should be taken into account in the interests of maintaining international peace and security. Development, in the shape of institution-building and State-building (recognizing the importance of enhancing national ownership and capabilities), inclusive institutions and enhancing peace and security through security sector reform programmes, for example, is then of direct relevance to the agenda of the Council and to breaking the cycle of conflict.

3. Proposed issues for debate

The maintenance of international peace and security supports peaceful societies, which enables successful, sustainable development. Equally, sustainable development fosters peaceful societies, which in turn supports the maintenance of international peace and security. At a State level, preventive action, from institution-building to preventive diplomacy, protects and strengthens State sovereignty.

Participants are invited to offer remarks about the connections between peace and security and development, in the context of supporting the Council's prevention agenda and working to better understand the root causes of conflicts. Some of the roots of conflict stunt development and, conversely, addressing root causes is equally beneficial and important to conflict prevention as it is to sustainable development. Participants could consider how supporting sustainable development

needs an effective Council that is able and ready to act decisively and preventively. In doing so, views on how to govern the interface between security and development in matters of international peace and security would be welcome. The Council's objective is not development, per se. Rather, it is to act to maintain international peace and security; in doing so, it reinforces that the peace and security agenda and the development agenda share common aims.

An overarching question is how much more joined up the Council should be on working across the security-development spectrum, including whether this could ever amount to joint working towards shared objectives — while remembering that this is not a debate about the Council implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. What more can the Council do to promote understanding of the interdependence of peace and development, and the central importance of inclusive institutions, the rule of law and access to justice to the achievement of both peace and development?

Related questions include what more the Council should be doing to address a range of issues (root causes) that can lead to conflict and that stunt peaceful societies and prevent them from flourishing. This includes, in particular, a lack of inclusivity in policies, a lack of equal access to services, politics and government, weak and unaccountable institutions and a lack of respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. This also has to include how the Council ensures that women and girls are engaged and active in peace settlements as much as they are, and should be, engaged in gender-sensitive and youth-sensitive development programming.

Conflict-sensitive programming and political and conflict analysis are just as important where peace operations are deployed as in United Nations country team settings, especially those operating in post-conflict environments.

This debate is aimed at enhancing the Council's understanding of how its work relates to and can better support development, in particular for States making the transition out of conflict, and the range of tools at the Council's disposal for prevention. This includes all forms of peace operations, Council intervention through statements and resolutions, using United Nations regional offices, a return to horizon scanning, support from the Secretary-General's good offices and hearing from the Peacebuilding Commission.

4. Conclusion

Failure to break the cycle of conflict leads to dire developmental outcomes. People in fragile and conflict-affected States are more than twice as likely to be undernourished as those in other developing countries. They are more than three times as likely to be unable to send their children to school, twice as likely to see their children die before they reach 5 years of age and more than twice as likely to lack access to clean water.

The average cost of internal armed conflict can be equivalent to more than 30 years of gross domestic product growth for a medium-sized developing country. Marginalization, exclusion and underdevelopment can in turn increase exposure to instability. This provides fertile ground for extremism, terrorism, organized crime and conflict to thrive, as well as leading to increases in migration and refugee flows. This has implications not just for countries' internal stability but also for the

security and development of neighbouring States and for international peace and security.

Addressing the interdependence between peace and security and development, remembering always the protection and cherishing of human rights, is not optional. It is imperative that the Council be open, remain open and explore how to improve the coherence of Council action in areas that have a development component aimed at securing peaceful societies and preventing conflict, i.e. in all situations before the Council.

5. Briefers

The Secretary-General will brief the Council. Alongside him, an invitation will be extended to the current Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate/civil society representative. The full list of briefers will be confirmed in due course.

6. Outcome

It is the intention of the United Kingdom to work towards a presidential statement following the debate, which will reflect the conclusions of the debate.

7. Procedural aspects

The debate will be chaired by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for International Development as the Cabinet Minister who oversees the disbursement of peacebuilding funds by the United Kingdom and who has a key stake in its stabilization and prevention efforts. Participation by ministers responsible for similar portfolios is encouraged, both from Council and non-Council members.

Briefers will be expected to speak for no more than 10 minutes. Council members are asked to keep their interventions to five minutes and non-Council members to four minutes. In accordance with standard procedure, Member States wishing to put themselves on the list of speakers will be able to do so by registering with the Security Council Affairs Division no earlier than three days before the debate.